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Norm(ative) Change in International Relations:  






Current contestations of the liberal international order stand in notable contrast with the earlier rise 
of international law during the post-cold war period. As Krieger and Liese argue, this situation calls 
for assessment of the type of change that is currently observed, i.e. norm change (Wandel) or a more 
fundamental transformation of international law – a metamorphosis (Verwandlung)? To address this 
question, this paper details the bi-focal approach to norms in order to reflect and take account of the 
complex interrelation between fact-based and value-based conceptions of norms. The paper is 
organised in three sections. The first section presents three axioms underlying the conceptual 
framework to study norm(ative) change which are visualised by a triangular operation to analyse this 
change in relation with practices and norms. The second section recalls three key interests that have 
guided IR norms research after the return to norms in the late 1980s. They include, first, allocating 
change in and through practice, second, identifying behavioural change with reference to norm-
following, and third, identifying norm(ative) change with reference to discursive practice. The third 
section presents the two analytical tools of the conceptual frame, namely, the norm-typology and the 
cycle-grid model. It also indicates how to apply these tools with reference to illustrative case 
scenarios. The conclusion recalls the key elements of the conceptual framework for research on 
norm(ative) change in international relations in light of the challenge of establishing sustainable 
normativity in the global order.  
 
* Professor of Political Science especially Global Governance, University of Hamburg. 
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Current contestations of the liberal international order stand in notable contrast with the earlier rise 
of international law during the post-cold war period. As Heike Krieger and Georg Nolte write in the 
first working paper of this series:  
“We are (…) interested in reassessing the state and development of international law in our 
time. This involves asking whether there is reason to question certain widely-held 
assumptions about its general development, be they generally held (factual) expectations and 
(normative) aspirations.” (Krieger and Nolte 2016: 5; emphasis added) 
Against the backdrop, Heike Krieger and Andrea Liese raise the general question:  
“Can we detect a metamorphosis while being part of it? Law is constantly evolving between its 
task to guarantee, protect and thus preserve certain values and the need to develop, and 
adapt to new exigencies.” (Krieger and Liese 2019: 5)  
And they invite scholars from International Law and International Relations “to assess whether we 
are currently observing yet another period of norm change (Wandel) or even a more fundamental 
transformation of international law – a metamorphosis (Verwandlung).” (Ibid.: 5) As a general 
yardstick for this task, they note that a “metamorphosis would require that more is changing than a 
single legal norm or a specific international institution.” (Ibid.: 5)  
To address the theme of norm change, this paper details the bi-focal approach to norms. It reflects 
and takes account of the complex interrelation between fact-based and value-based conceptions of 
norms. The approach is developed from the perspective of International Relations (IR) theory that 
straddles the boundaries of law and politics. It is argued that, so far, IR scholarship has largely kept 
the interrelation between fact-based and value-based inquiries of norm-change apart (Erskine 2013; 
Havercroft 2018) in IR theory. This separation has left a research gap which presents the ongoing and 
topical challenge of addressing both the normativity of norms in addition to the – by now well-
researched – normalcy of norms. As Jonathan Havercroft has shown, the predominant interest in the 
latter has generated a perception of “cryptonormativity” that derives the “goodness” of liberal norms 
from behaviour rather than from values (Havercroft 2018: 116; Ralph 2020).  
To reverse this bracketing of a value-based perspective on norms, this paper sketches a conceptual 
framework that centres on practice-based norm(ative) change. Building on theories of contestation 
and interactive international law, it argues that a turn towards practices of contestation and 
validation enables us to assess degrees of “sustainable normativity” (Wiener 2018, Ch. 3) that reflects 
the state of legitimacy in the global order. Following the quod omnes tangit principle (what touches 
all must be approved by all) (Owen and Tully 2007), the framework centres on the questions “whose 
practices count?” (observation) and “whose practices ought to count?” (evaluation) (Wiener 2018: 1). 
To establish the state of sustainable normativity, empirical research begins from observing global 
norm contestations, to then follow them to local sites in order to evaluate affected stakeholders’ 
access to norm contestation and validation in light of the normative opportunity structures that set 
 
1 For helpful comments on the first draft of this paper I would like to thank Andrea Liese and Heike Krieger. For 
research assistance, I thank Deborah Kirchgässner and Paula Bäurich. 
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the conditions for norm(ative) change locally. It then engages selected stakeholder groups’ 
respective discursive interventions in a global multilogue to identify norm(ative) change. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised in three sections. The first section presents three axioms 
underlying the conceptual framework to study norm(ative) change. They are visualised by a 
triangular operation to analyse norm(ative) change in relation with practices and norms (Figure 1, 
below). The second section recalls three key interests that have guided IR norms research after the 
return to norms in the late 1980s. They include, first, allocating change in and through practice, 
second, identifying behavioural change with reference to norm-following, and third, identifying 
norm(ative) change with reference to discursive practice. The third and final section of the paper 
presents the two analytical tools of the conceptual frame, namely, the norm-typology and the cycle-
grid model. It also indicates how to apply these tools with reference to illustrative case scenarios. 
The conclusion recalls (the) key elements of the conceptual framework for research on norm(ative) 
change in international relations in light of the challenge of establishing sustainable normativity in 
the global order. 
1. Three Axioms for Studying Norm(ative) Change 
The KFG project is topical, for it sheds light on the general question of how to frame research on 
normative change and which methods to apply. How do we as students of international law and 
international relations answer this question about normative change? This paper approaches the 
question from the perspective of an IR scholar. It offers a conceptual framework to understand and 
explain norm-change and normative change (hereafter: norm(ative) change). In doing so, it engages 
an “international relations perspective [which, as the editors stress,] is well suited to examine if, how 
and why values embodied in international norms are changing.” (Krieger and Liese 2019: 6)  The key 
objective lies in offering a conceptual frame that takes into account the societal context (such as 
especially socio-cultural background knowledge) and the political rules of engagement (such as the 
normative opportunity structure) which constitute the environment in which norm(ative) change 
takes place through practice (Finnemore and Toope 2001, Adler 2019).  
Three axioms form the conceptual frame. First, norms lie in the practice and therefore all practices 
are normative (Adler 2019). Second, given that what touches all must be approved by all (quod omnes 
tangit), analysing norm(ative) change must acknowledge both fact-based (whose practices count) 
and value-based (whose practices ought to count) drivers of norm(ative) change (Owen and Tully 
2007). Third, following the theories of contestation (Wiener 2014, 2018) and, relatedly, interactive 
international law (Brunnee and Toope 2012), the leading normative claim holds that “only a contested 
norm can ever be? a good norm” (Wiener 2020, in press). Against this backdrop, this paper addresses 
value decline and norm transformation as interconnected phenomena that are part of a larger 
historical process of global norm(ative) change. In a nutshell, it proposes a bi-focal approach to 
norms that conceptualises the fact-based and value-based dimensions of norms as inter-related, 
and details a conceptual framework to study norm(ative) change. 
The general argument begins from the observation that, despite the widely-shared constructivist 
understanding that norms and their meanings are context-dependent (Kratochwil 1984; Krook and 
True 2012; Wiener 2007), norms research has predominantly addressed the effect of norms on 
behavioural change and, especially, the behaviour of states (Katzenstein 1996, Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998). Essentially, therefore, we know more about the practice of norm-following and strategies to 
enhance or enforce compliance than about norm-generation as a bottom-up process that centres 
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on relations between people, including individuals (Gholiagha 2016; Hofius et al. 2014). The former 
demonstrates whether a “powerful” or “robust” norm matters to state actors (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
1999; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2019). The latter asks whose practices count and whose practices 
ought to count in order to achieve legitimacy of governance norms, thereby raising normative 
questions that move norms research beyond facts and towards values (Wiener 2014, 2018). By doing 
so, this approach ultimately seeks to establish whether a normative order is based on equal access 
to contestation for its constituent agents, identifying access to contestation as the condition for 
sustainable normativity based on ethical and legal terms (Brunnée and Toope 2011; Tully 2002; 
Wiener 2018).  
With regard to the legitimacy and legality of the international legal order, a bi-focal approach that 
is able to capture both fact-based and value-based triggers of norm(ative) change is therefore key. 
Regarding effects on the international legal order, it is proposed to examine norm-generative 
practices of contestation in order to identify norm(ative) change and establish how it affects the 
modicum of “sustainable normativity, i.e. a widely-shared perception of legality or justice that 
corresponds with a given social environment” required for maintaining the legitimacy of the 
international legal order (Wiener 2018: 38, citing Kratochwil 1984; Owen and Tully 2007; Forst 2010; 
Brunnée and Toope 2011). To document the point, this paper turns to the practices that are 
– actually – carried out (i.e. ‘the doing’) vis-à-vis a norm that works in and/or emerges from a given 
context such as a socially constituted and politically regulated order. It is argued that by studying 
norm-generative practices rather than norm-following practices, it becomes possible to identify 
pathways to participation via ‘organising principles’ at the meso-scale of the global order.  
With a view to undertaking the empirical research steps that lead to sites of contestation and 
facilitate the data-base to carry out normative evaluation, it is important to note that, while 
interrelated, research on ‘norm’ change and research on ‘normative’ change have been largely 
addressed by distinct methodological and conceptual frames. To take account of norm(ative) change 
that includes both as interrelated, this chapter recalls the key features of the “bi-focal” approach 
which connects ethical principles with social practices (Havercroft 2018; Wiener 2014; Ralph 2020). It 
is argued that in order to establish the effect that norm contestations have on change of the global 
order, it is necessary to overcome the bifurcated perspective that either addresses norms “as social 
facts” or “as ethical values” (Havercroft 2018: 116ff). To that end, the chapter recalls the “bi-focal” – 
empirical and normative – approach which “postulates that both the legitimation of norms and the 
generation of norms come about not via compliance, but via contestation.” (Havercroft 2018: 122, 
citing Wiener 2014) According to this approach which draws on James Tully’s public philosophy, 
conflict is a form of justice (Tully 2008 a, b, 2002, 2004). 
Against this backdrop and following the theory of contestation, the focus lies on the distinct practices 
of “reactive and proactive contestation”. This practice-based framework to study norm(ative) change 
aims to map scenarios of stakeholder engagement at local sites. It therefore assesses the legitimacy 
of the international order through case-based research of norm(ative) change lthat also facilitates 
perspectival claims on long-term conditions that are indicated by degrees of sustainable 
normativity. Conceptually speaking, this framework zooms in on the conditions that facilitate access 
to practices of contestation as the drivers of norm(ative) change. To establish the conditions of 
affected stakeholders’ access to these practices, the conceptual framework allows for zooming in on 
local contestations that are conditioned by local “normative opportunity structures” on the one 
hand, and then zooming out onto the global stage to explore potential pathways for staging global 
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multilogues including a majority of affected stakeholders to explore “themes of tension” and “global 
issues” that are reflected by the global “normative structure of meaning-in-use”, on the other 
(Wiener 2018, Ch. 8). Norm(ative) change in a global context is thus assessed with reference to two 
analytically distinct – local and global – normative structures, norm(ative).  
The framework centres on two methodological tools. The first is the norm typology that makes norm 
research viable for interdisciplinary research by distinguishing types of norms according to their 
moral reach and the expected degree of contestedness. The second is the cycle-grid model which 
facilitates a three-by-three table and the overlaying cycle that enable allocating the respective 
practices of contestation and types of validation (Wiener 2008, 66; 2018, Figure 2.1 and Table 3.1 
respectively, Wiener 2020, in press). The argument is developed against the background of the three 
main axioms of norms research which hold that first, norms have a dual quality (they are socially 
constructed and structuring), second, norms lie in the practice, and third, normative meaning is 
always contested (Wiener 2004, 2007; Puetter and Wiener 2009; Krook and True 2012; Winston 2017). 
Following the interconnected concepts of ‘norm(ative) change’, ‘norms’ and ‘practice’, respectively, 
the triangle situates early constructivist research on behaviour vis-à-vis norms (point B) with 
research on norm-change based on discursive practices (point C) on the one hand and practice-
based concepts of norm(ative) change (point A) on the other hand.  












The triangle highlights the challenge that arises for research seeking to analyse ‘norm(ative)’ change 
that takes account of both norms as social facts and norms as ethical values (compare point A at the 
top of the triangle). To that end, it presents norms and practices as necessarily related on the base 
line (compare points B and C of the triangle). Thus, it becomes possible to address change which is 
indicated with reference to a norm itself (does a formerly hidden norm emerge, does an extant norm 
change, is a new norm constituted?) as well as change that is revealed with reference to the 
underlying normative value of a norm (degrees of legality, legitimacy or acceptance). While the 
concepts at points B (practice) and C (norms) of the triangle represent the core elements that have 
been addressed by constructivist norms research over the past two decades or so, the norm(ative) 
practice concept at point A highlights the persistent and ongoing challenge of tackling values in 
relation with norms which norms researchers have often commented upon (compare Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 891; Katzenstein 1996: 5), yet barely managed to master (Frost 1996; Havercroft 2018). 
Following the practice-based perspective on norm(ative) change at point A of the triangle, the 
following section recalls the main constructivist arguments with regard to points B and C of the 
triangle.  
A: Norm(ative) Change 
value-based & fact-based 
C: Norms 
extant, hidden, emerging 
B: Practice 
behaviour vis-à-vis a norm 
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2. Indicators of ‘Change’: Extant Constructivist Norms Research 
With the research object of analysing ‘norm(ative)’ change in international relations in view, this 
section first identifies leading research questions that have been identified by the well-known 
constructivist literature on norms in international relations by scholars working at the interface of 
IR theory and International Law (IL). Secondly, it turns to the argument about ‘degrees of sustainable 
normativity’ in global society and how to identify them with the help of a conceptual framework and 
specific research tools. Throughout, this paper uses the term ‘norm(ative)’ rather than ‘norm’ or 
‘normative’ because neither change takes place in isolation. Norm-change is identified with 
reference to the local normative opportunity structure, in turn normative change is identified with 
reference to the global normative structure of meaning-in-use (Milliken 1999; Wiener 2009). Through 
the method of zooming in on local sites of contestation and then zooming out towards staging global 
multilogues, norm(ative) change, norms, and practices are analytically connected (compare Figure 1 
below). It follows that change is indicated with reference to both a specific norm and the underlying 
normative value of a norm. Both are revealed through practice vis-à-vis the norm, where the practice 
is brought to the fore by “norm-violations” (Wunderlich 2019) and or “contested compliance” (Wiener 
2004) with an extant norm. 
a) Allocating Change Within and Through Practice 
Constructivist norm research has predominantly been interested in addressing the “dynamics” of 
“change” in relation to norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2018; 
Stimmer and Wisken 2019). Notably, when probed for the indicator for ‘change’, most researchers 
would not focus on substantial change of a given norm but instead analyse changing patterns of – 
state – agents’ behaviour with regard to that norm. That is, when “norms returned” to IR with the 
critical regimes literature (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986) in the late 1980s (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 
890), constructivist scholarship considered changing state behaviour as a key indicator to 
demonstrate the important impact of norms. As “social facts”, norms were considered as a key 
indicator of behaviour next to material facts (Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 
1998). At the time and throughout much of the following decade, change was therefore identified 
with reference to behaviour, and norms, by contrast, were considered as stable structures that had 
a powerful effect: they were perceived as structuring state behaviour which, in turn, had a stabilising 
effect on the power (or legitimacy) of international law and order.  
This allocation of the indicator for change has paved the development of norms research for two 
decades or so, and it matters for today’s questions with regard to norm(ative) change. Today, as the 
editors emphasise, studying norm-change and normative change is no longer a mere matter of 
studying behaviour, nor should it be. While studying norm-change based on the concept of norms as 
social facts has by now been well-researched (Sandholtz 1998, 2019; Fligstein and Sandholtz 2008), 
value-based normative change remains widely under-researched. The current challenge therefore 
lies in the task of addressing norm(ative) change along the two substantively and qualitatively 
different dimensions of change, namely, studying norms as both social facts and as ethical values 
(Havercroft 2018). Accordingly, the leading questions are twofold. First, with regard to norm-change, 
researchers ask whether a formerly hidden norm emerges, an extant norm changes, or a new norm 
is constituted. For example, with regard to the prohibition of sexualised violence during wartime as 
a codified fundamental norm of international law (= extant type 1 norm), the ‘culture of impunity’ 
was a formerly hidden norm that emerged through contestations (= emergent formerly hidden type 
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2 norm), and the acceptance of ‘women’s meaningful participation’ emerged through behavioural 
practice (= new type 3 norm) (True and Wiener 2019, Table 1, p. 558; Wiener 2018: 181, Table 7.1).  
Second, in order to identify change with regard to underlying normative values, researchers raise 
questions about changing degrees of legality, legitimacy or acceptance of a norm (Brunnée and 
Toope 2012). This involves, for example, whether normative opportunity structures are strengthened 
through the growing acceptance of “norm bundles”, such as the Women, Peace and Security strategy 
(True and Wiener 2019: 553). The conceptual framework that is presented by this chapter addresses 
these dimensions and links them based on a “bi-focal” approach to research on norm(ative) change 
(Havercroft 2018: 116). The remainder of this section addresses the two dimensions, whereas the 
following section three then turns to the conceptual framework (i.e. the bifocal approach) and its 
two central tools (i.e. the norm-typology and the cycle-grid model) that are offered as a vantage 
point to study degrees of sustainable normativity. 
b) Behavioural Change: Norm-Following 
With the “return to norms” in IR theory in the 1990s (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889)2, social 
constructivists forged a new research programme which centred on ‘norm-following’. As Finnemore 
and Sikkink emphasise when explaining emergence, cascade, and internalisation as the three stages 
of the norm “life-cycle”,  
“we argue that the primary mechanism for promoting norm cascades is an active process of 
international socialization intended to induce norm breakers to become norm followers.” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902; emphasis added)  
Constructivists were well aware of the normative environment that set the conditions for compliance 
with good norms, such as women’s rights, the abolition of slavery, or human rights. That is, “new 
norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space 
where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest” (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 897).3  
At the time, the focus on compliant behaviour did reveal large patterns of change in so far as it 
triggered a paradigmatic shift in how to think about the importance of ‘the social’ as the fabric that 
did in fact matter for the constitution of international orders, borders, and identities and, equally, 
the question whether or not the norms of this order were implemented. This was acknowledged by 
international lawyers and IR theorists alike (compare Finnemore and Toope 2001). Furthermore, 
social constructivist norms research has identified significant behavioural change with reference to 
norms that was expressed as “international norm dynamics and political change”. This research 
 
2  As Finnemore and Sikkink argued: “The ‘turn’ away from norms and normative concerns began with the 
behavioral revolution and its enthusiasm for measurement” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889). 
3 “In the case of women's suffrage and later women's rights, norm entrepreneurs encountered alternative norms 
about women's interests and the appropriate role for women. In other words, new norms never enter a 
normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with 
other norms and perceptions of interest. This normative contestation has important implications for our 
understandings of the ways in which a "logic of appropriateness" relates to norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 897). 
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followed a core research interest “in the role norms play in political change” (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 888). For example, David Jacobson observed changing behavioural patterns with regard to the 
reference to and compliance with the fundamental norm of human rights, when a rising number of 
individual and nonstate based claims were accounted for with a range of international institutions. 
These human rights cases indicated a large change in the political landscape: “In the Euro-Atlantic 
core of the world order (…), the basis of legitimacy is shifting from principles of sovereignty and 
national self-determination to international human rights” (Jacobson 1996: 2). The fact that these 
human rights claims were brought by “individuals and nonstate entities” demonstrated that, in 
addition to states, these agents “are increasingly able to partake in shaping the international legal 
order through the forum of the state and are becoming international, indeed, transnational actors 
in their own right” (Jacobson 1996: 3). According to Jacobson, this behaviour demonstrated a 
“paradigmatic shift from state sovereignty to international human rights” in the 1970s, when “human 
rights become both the vehicle and the object of this revolution” (Ibid.; emphasis added). According 
to social constructivism, in international relations, such changes in the behaviour of states 
demonstrated the up to then underestimated impact of “social facts” as opposed to material facts 
(Ruggie 1998).  
To summarise, what constructivist norms research does very well is to explain norm compliance with 
reference to behaviour. Behavioural change was explained with reference to organisation sociology 
and there, especially March and Olson’s rediscovery of institutions and their impact on habit, 
appropriateness, and social recognition that were observed in given social communities (March and 
Olson 1989). In this regard, social recognition documents the appropriateness of a norm in a given 
normative environment. However, to demonstrate that a norm is followed merely documents 
behaviour vis-à-vis a norm. It does not reveal anything about the substantive quality of a norm. As 
Toni Erskine notes, “somebody needs to defend evaluative criteria (however grounded) for moral 
judgment if there is any hope of the happy marriage between the ethical and the empirical in IR.” 
(Erskine 2012: 458-9; in critical appreciation of Price 2008). 
c) Norm-Change: Discursive Contestation 
As long as research brackets norm-generative practices, this substantive quality of normative change 
therefore remains unknown. To bring this normative quality to that end, it must be de-bracketed. 
Research on contestation has begun to address the task of analytical de-bracketing with varying 
degrees of success. Effectively, constructivist research that sought to unpack practices of dissent 
proposed various types of contestation that distinguished discursive from behavioural contestation. 
For example, Stimmer and Wisken “differentiate between contestation by means of discourse, which 
we call ‘discursive contestation’, and contestation by means of actions that affect implementation, 
which we call ‘behavioural contestation’” (Stimmer and Wisken 2019: 516). While both types of 
contestation define behaviour vis-à-vis a given norm, it is important to note the latent long-term 
effect that lies buried by the concept of behavioural contestation. In other words, as long as it 
remains unspecified by discursive contestation, behavioural contestation is likely to generate a 
lasting unknown threat of a future normative back-lash: as long as the underlying normative values 
that motivate behavioural contestation remain analytically bracketed, important information with 
regard to identifying policy options to counter norm-breaching, such as pathways to participation 
(see e.g. the WPS ‘norm bundle’, True and Wiener 2019) remains unaccounted for. The following picks 
up from these distinct practices of norm validation to address the task of de-bracketing norm(ative) 
change. 
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In retrospective, it is notable that, rather than focusing on practices of contestation and their effect 
on normative change, social constructivist empirical research prioritised studying compliance with 
norms as indicated by norm-following and while finding the norm-generative effects of contestation 
observed by lawyers “instructive” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 915) largely left research on 
contestation and therewith details of the variety of norm-generative practices to international 
lawyers. This separation between norm-following and norm-generative behaviour meant that norm-
generation was predominantly studied as a formal rather than a socio-cultural process. They criticise 
social constructivists for being unable to study norm-generative effects, as “they struggle to explain 
the emergence and constitution of norms themselves” (Bueger and Gadinger 2015: 3). This has 
become a main point of critique of the “practice turners” (Hofius 2019, in press) who suggest studying 
the shared knowledge about interconnected elements of the larger practice instead (Bueger and 
Gadinger 2015: 4, citing Reckwitz 2002: 250). 
The practice-based and relational concept of norm(ative) change that is visualised by the triangle 
(see Figure 1 above) seeks to re-incorporate cultural knowledge. In addition to the international law 
literature on norm-generative practice as constitutive for the legal validity of a norm, this reference 
to everyday experience, cultural capability, and background knowledge (Wenger 1998) accounts for 
norm-generative practices that are constitutive for cultural validity of a norm. Together, social 
recognition, formal validation, and cultural validation represent practice-based accounts to answer 
the question of ‘whose practices count’ in the larger constitutive process of normative order. To 
recall this norm-generative process, it is important to study discursive practices rather than 
behavioural practices. For non-discursive behaviour, such as social recognition or behavioural 
contestation, merely reflect the workings of a norm that is perceived as a social fact. It cannot reveal 
information about the meanings an agent associates with a norm, i.e. the workings of a norm as an 
ethical value. It follows that, to devise the ethical value of a norm from its observed power as a social 
fact would imply working with the principle of “cryptonormativism”. As Jonathan Havercroft 
observed, the “focus on demonstrating that norms exist and shape the behaviors of states 
necessarily brackets the international ethics question of whether or not a norm is ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ 
‘just’ or ‘unjust’.” And, as a consequence of this methodological bracketing of the ‘normative’ 
dimension of norms, “a kind of cryptonormativism has crept into constructivist research”. That is, 
“constructivist scholars often assume or imply that a given norm (such as norms prohibiting weapons 
use, norms against torture, or norms promoting human rights) is good without fully elaborating the 
reasons for it” (Havercroft 2018: 117). 
To address the editors’ question about the type of norm(ative) change the crisis of international law 
implies requires studying practices of discursive contestation that disclose why and how norms are 
objected, by whom, and under which wider normative conditions. The only way of tapping into the 
meanings that a plurality of affected stakeholders ascribes to a norm’s meanings therefore lies in 
the empirical analysis of discursive contestation. While this has been done quite comprehensively 
by constructivist norms research over the past two decades, most research has centred on discursive 
contestation as practiced within given formalised settings (compare especially the literature 
following Habermas 1995 and Teubner, e.g. Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2019). Yet, these formalised 
settings are exclusively accessible to a selection of privileged agents, such as state representatives, 
bureaucrats, and/or diplomats. This implies that the empirically collected ‘repertoire’ generated 
through the collection of discursive contestations leaves the majority of affected stakeholders to 
one side. Rather than taking account of the quod omnes tangit principle as a condition of sustainable 
normativity, these contestatory practices remain exclusive.  
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Focusing on elite-based discursive contestation is therefore more likely to work inside political 
communities with formal membership with a functioning liberal representational scheme that relies 
on a strict separation of internal and external norms (and obligations) (Jahn 2018), and which 
therefore is more capable of keeping latent behavioural contestation in check. In a globalised setting 
with plural forms of political representation that reflect complex economic, social, and cultural inter-
relations, the meanings that are associated with norms even though they may be shared in principle 
become more diverse. Consider, for example, the general acceptance of fundamental norms (type 1), 
such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law which are characterised by an expectation of 
a low degree of (proactive) contestation, but which will become more contested when it comes to 
detailed implementation with regard to the specific organising principles (type 2 norms) and 
standardised procedures (type 3 norms) that are required for their implementation (compare Table 
1, below). To understand norm(ative) change and to build on that insight in order to establish and 
maintain sustainable normativity in global society, therefore requires a conceptual frame that 
facilitates tapping into the discursive contestatory practices of the plurality of global agents. The 
following turns to the details of this conceptual frame. 
3. Norm(ative) Change and Sustainable Normativity 
This section details the conceptual framework to study norm(ative) change. It is known as the ‘bi-
focal’ approach because it links the two pillars of norms studies, i.e. norms as social facts and norms 
as ethical values. In the following, this section details the elements and concepts of this framework 
and illustrates their application as it evolves. The framework centres on the norm-typology and the 
cycle-grid model. Both facilitate an interdisciplinary perspective on norm(ative) change that frames 
norms research as an activity that “follows the conflict” (Marcus 1995: 110) in order to establish the 
basis for sustained normativity. The research framework is structured by three ethical principles, 
each of which initiates distinct research activities. 
First, the principle of contestedness (P1) reflects diversity and distinct individual background 
experience which imply that a norm’s meanings are always contested when addressed by those 
affected by it. Therefore, norm contestation is central to establishing mutually shared recognition at 
local sites where global norms stand to be implemented. The principle of contestedness indicates 
the first research activity of identifying contestations through sensitising reading and zooming in on 
local sites of conflict. 
Second, the principle of quod omnes tangit (P2) implies the ground rule of what touches all must be 
approved by all. Therefore, it matters to establish whose practices count in local norm contestations, 
and relatedly, raise the question of whose practices ought to count in order to improve access to 
contestation as a condition for sustainable normativity. The QOT principle leads to the second 
research activity of mapping local sites of norm contestation. 
And third, the principle of sustainable normativity (P3) represents a situation where local access to 
practices of norm contestation and types of norm validation are balanced. It serves as an indicator 
for assessing the probability of conflict as a consequence of a tip of the balance, when affected 
stakeholders’ access to proactive contestation is threatened. The principle of sustainable 
normativity enables the third and fourth research activities of identifying norm-change and 
evaluating normative change, respectively.  
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The conceptual framework details four research steps: first, sensitising reading identifies and defines 
a contested norm according to the norm-typology; second, zooming in on the site of contestation 
with reference to the cycle-grid; third, identifying conditions of access to contestation for affected 
stakeholders; and fourth, evaluating norm change with reference to the local normative opportunity 
structure, as well as normative change with reference to the global normative structure of meaning-
in-use (Wiener 2018, esp. Ch. 8). The following summarises this conceptual framework and illustrates 
its application with reference to the two methodological tools – norm-typology and cycle-grid model 
– and points of illustration through case scenarios.4 
a) Norm Typology 
The bi-focal approach seeks to tackle the challenge of de-bracketing norm-generative practices. 
Taking account of the constructivist axiom that “while stable at times, in principle, the meaning of 
norms is always contested” (Wiener 2004, 2007; Krook and True 2012; Winston 2017). The primary 
research step consists in sensitising reading where the principle of “contestedness” is conceived as 
a “sensitising concept” (Blumer 1954: 7; cited in Bowen 2006: 2). Subsequent research “follows the 
conflict” (Marcus 1995) about norms to the sites of contestation, establishes the conditions of 
participation in the conflict for all affected stakeholders, and evaluates norm(ative) change. While 
contestation lies in the nature of socially constituted entities like norms, the efforts to capture the 
work of norms have often fallen hostage to the conundrum of Multidisciplinarity. 5  To avoid 
interdisciplinary misunderstandings6 and enable more focussed efforts to study shared research 
issues based on a terminology that allows for more rigorous transdisciplinary research 
collaboration7, the norm-typology helps clarifying the terminology, especially with regard to the 
definition of types of norms as well as the types of practices that are brought to bear in relation to 
them.  
Underlying are three assumptions that are devised from qualitative methodologies in the social 
sciences: first, the relation between practice and norms is a necessary condition in order to 
understand norm(ative) change as indicated by the triangle (compare Figure 1); second, norms come 
in different types that can be generally distinguished with reference to these indicators: on the one 
hand, the degree of objection to a norm (observable as practices of contestation) and on the other 
hand, the moral or ethical reach of a norm (devised from ethical theories). Together, the respective 
degree of contestation and moral reach of a norm represent the analytical relation between norms 
as social facts and as ethical values (Havercroft 2018). This relational display underlies the distinction 
 
4 The framework is developed and illustrated in considerably more detail in its book-length version which 
details three illustrative case scenarios based on the norms of fundamental rights, the prohibition of torture 
and the prohibition of sexualised violence against women and girls during wartime 
 (see Wiener 2018; and for a summary of the framework and research results, see Table 8.1, p. 222). 
5 For a philosophical and more general take on disciplinary distinctions including the social sciences and life 
sciences, note these three definitions: “Multidisciplinarity draws on knowledge from different disciplines but 
stays within the boundaries of those fields. Interdisciplinarity analyses, synthesizes and harmonizes links 
between disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole. Transdisciplinarity integrates the natural, social 
and health sciences in a humanities context, and in doing so transcends each of their traditional boundaries” 
(citing Choi and Pak 2006: 359; in Alvargonzalez 2011: 388). 
6 The following definition of interdisciplinary applies here: “interdisciplinarity refers to an activity that exists 
among existing disciplines or in a reciprocal relationship between them.” Notably, “interdisciplinarity would 
not negate the independence of each discipline” (Alvargonzalez 2011: 388). 
7 The following definition of transdisciplinarity applies: transdisciplinarity “concerns transcending the 
disciplines, going across and through the different disciplines, and beyond each individual discipline” 
(Alvargonzalez 2011: 388). 
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of three norm types. Against this background, the typology provides a methodological reference for 
research that seeks to establish two things: first, why a given norm is considered as more or less 
prone to contestation, and second, where at the distinct scales of order the norm is ‘at work’ (Wiener 
2018: 62). 
Table 1 (see below) illustrates the distinct norm types with reference to global climate governance, 
where fundamental norms (type 1) include protecting human kind (UNCLOS) and climate justice; 
organising principles (type 2) include the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
(UNFCCC); and the standards (type 3) of CO2 emission goals and limits of temperature increase, for 
example. Each norm type entails a distinct degree of moral reach and institutional detail, 
respectively, which implies that distinct inputs of contestation need to be accounted for. For 
example, the need for proactive contestation is especially high with fundamental norms (type 1) 
which are defined based on values leave details of norm implementation to be negotiated amongst 
stakeholders, on the top of the range, and reactive contestation where standards (type 3) represent 
institutional or legal facts, that may stakeholders may object to, rather than critically engage with, 
on the other. The most important and politically relevant norms are organising principles (type 2) 
which represent a hybrid quality, insofar as they are derived from values, while leaving a relatively 
broad and flexible margin for negotiation with reference to procedures and institutions. It is here, at 
the meso-scale of any order (local, regional, national, global), where the two fact- and value-based 
dimensions of norms are present. It is here, where issue-related value-based policy strategies are 
generated through practice. 
Table 1: Norm Typology  
 
Together with the cycle-grid model (compare Figure 2) which will be presented below, this typology 
allows for assessing and addressing the sustainable normativity in global society. The norm-typology 
includes three types of norms: fundamental norms (type 1), organising principles (type 2), and 
standardised procedures and rules (type 3). As the following will detail, most theories have an 
established terminology of referring to type 1 and type 3 norms, even when not using these 
typological distinctions. What most theories lack is the concept of type 2 norms, yet, as I have argued 
elsewhere, it is usually the type 2 norm which indicates room for compromise and space for progress 
with regard to building novel pathways for international policy strategies. It is argued that type 2 
• Type 1 – Macro: Fundamental principles
• Example: Climate justice, Protection of 
Humankind (UNCLOS)
• Type 2 – Meso: Organising principles
• Examples: Common But Differentiated 
Responsibility (CBDR); Deep Decarbonisation
• Type 3 – Micro: Standards
• Example: CO2 emission standards, temperature 
increase between 1.5 and 2%
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norms represent a central role in the norm-generative process. This is due to the balance between 
reactive and proactive contestation at the meso-scale of political order. The following first details 
the typology and then offers illustrative examples before the norm-generative effect of the distinct 
practices of discursive contestation will be addressed in the concluding section on sustainable 
normativity. 
Fundamental norms entail the broadest possible moral or ethical reach and the lowest degree of 
contestation as type 1 norms. These norms include human rights, democracy, sovereignty, the rule 
of law, torture prohibition, sustainable fishery, the right to fish, and so on. They are located at the 
macro-scale of global order. In the language of international law, type 1 norms are also referred to 
as peremptory norms, grundnorms, or principles (compare De Wet, in this volume; Slaughter 2004 
Alexy 2010). At the opposite end of the typology’s spectrum, we find standardised procedures or 
regulations with a very limited moral or ethical reach, yet with a high probability of contestation. 
These are classified as type 3 norms. Lawyers also refer to these norms as ‘rules’ (Alexy 2010). Type 3 
norms provide the details for implementing type 1 norms. They are located at the micro-scale of 
global order and contested on local sites. Alexy summarises the relation concisely when noting that  
“(R)ules are norms that require something definitively. They are definitive commands. (…) If a 
rule is valid and applicable, it is definitively required that exactly what it demands be done. If 
this is done, the rule is complied with; if this is not done, the rule is not complied with. By 
contrast, principles are norms requiring that something be realized to the greatest extent 
possible, given the factual and legal possibilities at hand. Thus, principles are optimization 
requirements” (Alexy 2010: 21; Alexy 2014: 512).  
What has been addressed in less concise terms are ‘organising principles’ or type 2 norms that are 
located at the meso-scale ‘in-between’ type 1 fundamental norms and type 3 standardised rules. 
These type 2 norms play a central role for norm-generative purposes, for they emerge directly from 
practices through ‘doing’ politics or policy-making. Examples of these type 2 norms range from the 
well-known principles of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR), the responsibility to 
protect (R2P), and, relatedly, the less prominent principle of responsibility while protecting (RwP) or 
the ‘Solange’ principle of European Union politics (compare the proto-types listed in Table 1, below). 
They are hence shared by groups of policy-makers or politically engaging affected stakeholders. As 
such, this type of norm comes closest to being generated through discursive practices of 
contestation (as opposed to mere reiterated interactive behaviour). This norm-generative effect of 
discursive contestation at the meso-scale is significant with regard to assessing sustainable 
normativity. The effect remains to be established by the four research stages (i.e. sensitising reading, 
mapping contestation, evaluating access to contestation, identifying norm(ative) change). The 
following will elaborate on the details of this evaluation with reference to the three practices of norm 
validation (as the cycle-grid model demonstrates in more detail below).8 
To summarise, the recourse to a norm ‘typology’ is carried with reference to interdisciplinary sources 
drawing on sociological methodology, on constructivist norms research as well as on public 
 
8 The distinction between rules and principles requires establishing the weight of one principle over another 
when opposing principles are at play. To that end, Alexy proposes a focus on ‘balancing’. As he explains, 
“(R)ules aside, the legal possibilities are determined essentially by opposing principles. For this reason, 
principles, each taken alone, always comprise merely prima facie requirements. The determination of the 
appropriate degree of satisfaction of one principle relative to the requirements of other principles is brought 
about by means of balancing. Thus, balancing is the specific form of application of principles” (Alexy 2014, 512; 
emphasis added AW). 
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philosophy. 9  It offers three main conceptual reference points for research that seeks to study 
norm(ative) change. First, it offers a conceptual framework that speaks to the state-of-the-art 
literature in both international relations theory and international law. This interdisciplinary context 
seeks to prevent cross-disciplinary misinterpretations and provide a background for forging more 
rigorous transdisciplinary research on norm(ative) change. Second, by linking types of norms through 
distinct practices of contestation (i.e. reactive and proactive) at the macro-, meso- and micro-scales 
of global order, it becomes possible to account for and evaluate the norm-generative effect of 
discursive practice with reference to norms as social facts and norms as ethical values. And third, 
the typology allows for assessing norm-change with regard to stages of norm-change indicated by 
the categories of emergent, extant, and/or hidden norms (Wiener 2018). When applying the typology 
to study norm(ative) change, case studies will undertake empirical research that identifies types of 
norms, practices of contestation, and norm-change with reference to selected situations of conflict 
where the principle of ‘contestedness’ is brought to the fore by contested encounters.  
b) The Cycle-Grid Model 
To evaluate the effect of the norm(ative) change that is generated through practices of contestation, 
the cycle-grid model represents a selection of nine ideal-typical local sites on the grid where types 
of norms, involved stakeholders, and local normative opportunity structures are accounted for 
through local mapping on site (compare Figure 2, below). The following details the application of the 
cycle-grid model.  
 
9 The norm typology has been developed through interdisciplinary conversations over the past two decades. It 
was kicked off by recurring critical encounters in academia and beyond that centred on diverging 
interpretations of the citizenship norm: while some defined citizenship according to the standardised rules 
and regulations that followed from the status, others regarded it as a fundamental norm with a significant 
role in the process of state-building. By distinguishing the two norms according to their respective moral 
reach and expected degree of contestation where the former ranks as a type 3 norm and the latter as a type 1 
norm, it became possible to consider the findings of the respective empirical research as complementary 
rather than competitive, and thus make sense of the ‘workings’ of these respective norm-types. The current 
chapter summarises the typology drawing on earlier publications of the typology (see Wiener 2008, 2014, 
2018). 
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Figure 2: Cycle Grid Model  
 
Source: Wiener 2018: 44 
The grid offers a frame to present the interconnectedness of local contestations with global 
normative change.  
“By establishing a connection between interaction on the ground and contested norms in the 
global normative structure of meaning-in-use through engagement, the practices of norm 
validation and contestation are brought to bear through mapping and evaluating the 
utterances of distinct affected stakeholders. This connection is generated by turning directly 
to the ‘field of interaction in which the conflict arises’” (Wiener 2018: 30). 
Against this background, the next steps include identifying practices of contestation: are they merely 
reactive (i.e. revealing objection to a norm or its violation) or are they proactive (i.e. revealing proper 
access to critical engagement with normative substance)? As well as evaluating access to the three 
practices of norm validation (i.e. formal, social and cultural) that ought to be available to affected 
stakeholders in the best-case scenario in accordance with the quod omnes tangit principle. “To 
situate agency on the ground through these practices”, the model “differentiate(s) three practices of 
norm validation (formal, social, and cultural validation) and two types of contestation (reactive and 
pro-active)” (Wiener 2018: 30). In this regard, praxiography suggests the method of ‘zooming in on a 
distinct practice, a crisis situation, or an object’ (Bueger and Gadinger 2015: 9; Hofius 2016: 942). The 
method is helpful for examining practices of norm validation on site.  
The model reflects the bi-focal approach with reference to the distinction of nine sites that allow for 
allocating and zooming in on local sites of contestation (on the grid) and, in addition, for evaluation 
of the conditions of access to contestation that constrain or enable affected stakeholders’ 
participation in norm-generative practice on these sites (on the cycle). The three practices of norm 
validation (formal, social, and cultural) demonstrate the range of options. In the best-case scenario, 
the most powerful stakeholders will have access to all three practices of norm validation and 
therefore achieve the highest degree of legitimacy, therewith sustaining the legality of a norm. By 
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contrast, in the expected everyday scenario, affected stakeholders will be expected to enjoy access 
to contestation that is constrained according to societal, political, geographic, or economic 
conditions on site. This bi-focal approach thus expands social constructivist research that centred 
on norm-following behaviour (as shown in Section 1 above), insofar as it adds three practices of 
norm validation that have been developed from the “’political approach’ to norm conflict that begins 
with a conflict instead of with a norm, and then turns to ‘struggles over recognition’ about a norm” 
(Wiener 2018: 38, citing Owen and Tully 2007: 267). 
While earlier, constructivist research “stressed constitutive over evaluative norms and hence 
established an analytical preference for the normalcy of norms” (Katzenstein 1996), the resulting 
emphasis on constitutive practices leaves room to add a normative dimension that seeks to 
appreciate the norm-generative effect of all practices of validation, i.e. formal validation, social 
recognition (aka habitual validation), and cultural validation. The cycle is designed to take account 
of both contingent and principled conditions that influence norm implementation. Three research 
assumptions follow for allocating practices of reactive and proactive norm con- testation empirically. 
First, given the indication of breaches with extant fundamental norms through objection by affected 
stakeholders, reactive contestation is expected to occur on Sites 3, 6, and 9 (i.e. the macro-, meso-, 
and micro-scales at the implementing stage). Second, pending on the involved stakeholders and the 
local conditions for critical engagement with these breaches, proactive contestation is most likely to 
take place at Sites 2, 5, and 8 (i.e. the macro-, meso-, and micro-scales at the negotiating stage). And 
third, depending on the affected stakeholder’s position vis-à- vis formal government institutions, 
both reactive and proactive contestation may take place at Sites 1, 4, and 7 (i.e. the macro-, meso-, 
and micro- scales at the constituting scale). Notably, the ascription of the distinct scales of global 
order depends on the contestation repertoire within the wider global context. For example, the 
allocation of, say, state representatives engaging in contestatory practices depends on their position 
vis-à- vis a given norm conflict. That is, in case scenarios that examine globally constituted norms, 
state representatives are located on Site 7 (this is the case in the torture prohibition case scenario 
(Wiener 2018, Ch. 6).  
To summarise, by allocating contestations to sites, empirical research establishes where distinct 
groups of stakeholders engage. Given the importance of dialogue for achieving shared positions 
(such as organising principles) or pathways for policy-making to counter breaches of norms, 
stakeholders would need to engage on the same site. This stands to be examined empirically. The 
cycle-grid model advances an “agency-centred vantage point” that emphasises the question of  
“access. That is, who among the affected stakeholders has the opportunity, if not the right, to 
partake in this interaction? In most cases of conflict about extant fundamental norms in 
international relations, access to norm validation and contestation remains clearly restricted 
(i.e. favouring state representatives operating through international organisations). And the 
access opportunities become even more exclusive with court proceedings. The exploratory 
approach circumvents these restrictions by putting affected stakeholders into a dialogue, 
even though they have – most likely – not been in a real-time conversation” (Wiener 2018: 30). 
Drawing on the principles of mutual recognition and mutual elucidation that are central to Tully’s 
public philosophy (see especially Tully 2016, and Tully 2019 in press), the link is performed by 
academic intervention when zooming out of a local conflict. That is, following the conflict allows for 
zooming in on a conflict site, mapping the details and evaluating access to then intervene by 
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establishing a series of inter-textual encounters. The intention is to “give affected stakeholders a 
‘virtual voice’ in the global multilogue” (Wiener 2018: 4). 
“Following from the exercise of allocating stakeholders and compiling contestation 
repertoires, the next research endeavour identifies the conditions of access to norm 
validation. This assessment of access to practices of norm validation is undertaken to in order 
to evaluate the cultural underpinnings of the norm-change that is generated through these 
contestations. The evaluation is facilitated by the spatio-temporal allocation of practices of 
norm validation at each site, and by taking spatio-temporal stages of governance and socio-
cultural layers of society into account. Notably, the cycle metaphor is used to indicate 
conditions of unequal access to norm validation. The three practices are on the revolving 
cycle, and the arrow indicates the condition that, in principle, each practice ought to be 
accessible for all stakeholders at all times. This is not the case in practice, however because 
contingent normative opportunity structures apply. To document that, research examines 
which practice is accessible to whom. This is achieved through the method of zooming in on 
sites of contestation. At each site affected stakeholders encounter themselves in a contingent 
context that enables or constraints distinct options of access to three practices of norm 
validation” (Wiener 2018: 44-45).  
Conclusion 
In order to address the question ‘whose practice counts?’ in global norm conflicts, the cycle-grid 
model offers a framework to illustrate a conflict that usually centres on an extant type 1 norm. This 
is achieved through the method of sensitising reading as the first of four steps to analyse norm(ative) 
change. The second step then follows the conflict to locate it on one of the nine ideal-typical sites 
on the cycle-grid model (see Figure 2) to identify affected stakeholders. To address the question 
‘whose practices ought to count?’, stakeholders’ access to the practices of contestation (i.e. reactive 
= objection only, or proactive = critical engagement with the norm’s substantive values) and the three 
types of norm validation (formal, social, cultural) is assessed and evaluated against the quod omnes 
tangit principle and the local normative opportunity structure which defines the local conditions of 
participation (compare also Brunnee and Toope 2011). It is therefore key to understanding the 
conditions of sustainable normativity in a given case. Typically, research will seek to group affected 
stakeholders according to their claims regarding a given norm conflict. And it will then organise 
interventions in a series of settings according to the time and place of these interventions. To analyse 
norm(ative) change, it is helpful to study practices of contestation prior to and following a point in 
time when a significant change with regard to the quality of a norm has been accomplished. For 
example, with regard to global climate governance, such moments are represented in 1995 with the 
Kyoto Protocol, with regard to the prohibition of sexual violence, the moment is represented by 
Resolution 1325 that established Women, Peace, and Security policy in 2000, and so on. 
By reconstructing the reactive and proactive contestations about the breaches with a given norm, it 
becomes possible to demonstrate how extant norms are contested, how hidden norms come to the 
fore, or, how new norms emerge. Of key interest with regard to the goal of achieving sustainable 
normativity, i.e. a balance between access to reactive contestation allowing stakeholders to voice 
objection, on the one hand, and proactive contestation enabling stakeholders to critically engage 
with a norm’s substance, on the other, are emerging organising principles (type 2 norms) and/or 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3638205




pathways towards them. The cycle–grid model’s distinction among three practices of norm validation 
helps bringing a second – previously hidden – type 2 norm to the fore.  
The purpose of applying a bi-focal approach to study the norm(ative) effect of a norm conflict lies in 
establishing whether a change of the normative opportunity structure merely contributed to 
institutional change within the normative opportunity structure, or, whether the contestations (i.e. 
the practice repertoire of a given conflict) might potentially have a wider transformative effect on the 
global normative structure of meaning-in-use. Two research assumptions guide the analysis. First, in 
a sub-unit of global society (i.e. as demonstrated by practices on site) the degree of sustainable 
normativity is expected to rise with balanced access to reactive and proactive contestation on behalf 
of affected stakeholders. Second, and relatedly, when this balance is threatened and reactive 
contestation prevails, the potential for political conflict beyond a sub-unit grows (i.e. as 
demonstrated by practices on n+1 sites). To examine the effect of both practices of contestation over 
the two periods (i.e. settings 1 and 2 in a given case scenario), the empirical research zooms in on 
the contestations and maps these within a global multilogue. Against this background, multiple and 
distinct contributions within a conflict that is mapped over time are reconstructed with reference to 
specific utterances and then evaluated with regard to novel norms and global normative change. 
This reconstruction of contestations that form part of a global norm conflict follows the step of 
sensitising reading. It shows how access to the two types of contestation (i.e. reactive or proactive) 
and the three practices of norm validation (i.e. formal, social, and cultural) in reflection of the 
normative opportunity structure on site, works on normative change in global society.  
The cycle–grid model offers the framework for identifying norm validation at local sites. Sensitising 
reading – applying the principle of contestedness (P1) indicates instances where the sexual violence 
norm is breached. The conceptual framework features an agency-centred approach that begins from 
the practice to explore its effect on norm change. It facilitates studying contestation repertoires for 
a given norm conflict and evaluating affected stakeholders’ opportunities to generate norm 
appropriation through access to norm validation as the platform for proactive contestation. In a 
chosen case scenario, the run-up to a ‘landmark’ moment in the trajectory was indicated by reactive 
contestation, and the follow-up brought proactive contestations to the fore as the driver for 
normative change and, more generally, normative change, as it were. The potential for norm 
appropriation is probed against the principle of sustainable normativity (P3) and the potential for 
proactive contestation is probed against the quod omnes tangit principle (P2). The sensitising 
reading is guided by the principle of contestedness (P1), seeking to locate local contestations 
according to stages of norm implementation and scales of global order. The cycle–grid model thus 
serves as a frame to allocate practices of contestation on the grid and, relatedly, determine the 
conditions for specific stakeholders’ proactive contestation based on the cycle ’s three practices of 
norm validation. As such, the cycle–grid model seeks to move beyond a research operationalisation 
from the starting point of a choice between a pre-defined ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ perspective. 
Instead, it allows researchers to take into account the impact of crisscrossing normative orders which 
do not develop along state-centred organisational patterns, and shed light on crisscrossing 
stakeholder practices that engage with these orders.  
To summarise, the bi-focal approach facilitates a frame in order to demonstrate how practices of 
contestation and norm validation change the meaning-in-use throughout the process of norm 
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implementation.10 The hybrid value- and fact-based approach includes the principled evaluation of 
norm(ative) change in addition to observable norm change. That is, the moral reach of this change 
is evaluated by taking the quod omnes tangit principle (P2) and the sustainable normativity principle 
(P3) into account when studying norm(ative) change in global society. To account for crisis effects of 
international law, the illustrative case that was summarised in the previous section, followed a global 
conflict to the local sites where affected stakeholders engaged in contestations about breaches of 
the norm. The underlying ethical goal consists in countering injustice, the empirical study asks 
whether the negotiation and implementation of the sexual violence prohibition norm has generated 
organising principles that facilitate novel pathways of participation (i.e. measures or policies that 
enhance access for affected stakeholders).11 
Following the cycle–grid model, the best possible outcome of proactive contestation consists in 
emergent type 2 norms that enhance access to norm validation for affected stakeholders. These 
organising principles are key indicators of norm(ative) change. When taking into account that, by 
definition, type 2 norms are key to establishing and maintaining a modicum of normative 
sustainability (i.e. medium moral reach and degree of contestation), they point towards pathways 
for enhanced participation (i.e. ‘entry points’ bringing stakeholders into policy-making and/or 
politics). Given contingent environments in each global conflict scenario, outcomes are expected to 
differ. For example, proactive contestation may either generate more than one type 2 norm, or shed 
light on other previously hidden norms. If the latter is the case, the sensitising reading of available 
primary and secondary sources will add to the literature on both empirical and normative accounts, 
as it were.  
Notably, the bi-focal approach emphasises the local-global co-constitution of norm(ative) change. 
For each norm conflict represents global proportions, insofar as it comes to the fore through 
objections to the perceived situation of injustice from the perspective of affected stakeholders at a 
variety of locations. When presented as a process spanning an arc from the constitution of an extant 
norm through contestations of norm breaches to the re-constitution of the global normative 
structure of meaning-in-use, these trajectories reveal critical engagements that bring cultural 
background capabilities to bear. The trajectories are contingent. They span norm contestations 
which are shaped by a variety of contingencies which the cycle–grid model allows to locate (grids) 
and evaluate (cycle).   
 
10 For the latter, see also Laura Shepherd’s insightful article on NGOs and the UNSC as the two main sites of 
‘authority’ for the construction of meaning in the UN policy process; see Shepherd 2008: 384, quoting Yanow 
1996. 
11  The pathways reflects what is called ‘entry points’ for addressing impacts on Sexual and Gender Based 
Violence (SGBV); see http://www.unhcr.org/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html" and recurrence of 
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